THE DEEP DILIGENCE DOSSIER

1. Executive Summary

The investigation was triggered by a specific client query concerning a promised investment of £27 million into IBB Media's film fund, ostensibly part of a larger £100 million tranche. The transaction has been beset by repeated delays, with the current justification being the investor's hospitalization due to infection. The resulting analysis indicates a critical probability of advanced fee fraud or, at best, a transaction involving high-risk Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) with frozen assets, severe legal liabilities, and a documented history of financial delinquency. The transaction structure exhibits classic hallmarks of "Prime Bank" or "High-Yield Investment" fraud, leveraging the identity of a legally embattled Indian national to secure credibility while using a dormant UK shell company as the brokerage vehicle.

2. Critical Risk Dashboard

The following dashboard summarizes the highest-priority risk factors identified during the investigation. These factors, individually and in aggregate, present a fatal risk profile for the proposed transaction. The convergence of criminal exposure and administrative chaos makes the deal non-viable for any regulated institution.

3. Strategic Conclusion & Recommendation

The investigation strongly suggests that the Primary Subject (Martin Gernon) is currently the target of a sophisticated Advance Fee Fraud scheme. The "Indian Investor" (Dhaya) is a real person with a high-profile name and verified health issues, which lends a dangerous verisimilitude to the scam narrative. However, his assets are frozen by Indian federal agencies, making a legitimate transfer of £27m–£100m legally and practically impossible. The "broker" (Sateesh) is utilizing a corporate vehicle that is repeatedly on the brink of administrative dissolution, further undermining the credibility of the deal structure.

4. Subject Identification & Detailed Profile Analysis

4.1 Martin Gernon (Primary Subject)

The investigation has positively identified the primary subject as Martin Francis Gernon, a British national with a verifiable history in the brass band music industry and recent forays into film and media production. He acts as the linchpin for IBB Media but appears to have limited experience with transactions of this magnitude.

Full Legal Name: Martin Francis Gernon
Date of Birth: April 1968
Nationality: British
Current Role: Active Director, IBB Media Limited
Correspondence Address: Unit C, Rochdale Central Industrial Estate, Norman Street, Rochdale, United Kingdom, OL11 4NS

Professional Background:

• Centre Stage Group: Managing Director of The Centre Stage Group Ltd, specializing in the sale of uniforms and percussion instruments to brass and military bands. This establishes him as a legitimate SME operator with international sourcing experience.
• Brass Band Community: Prominent figure in the brass band sector, having served as Chairman of the Fairey Band and as a percussionist for the Brighouse and Rastrick Brass Band. Recently resigned as Musical Director of St John's Band (Mossley) to focus on professional commitments.
• Pivot to Media: In 2018, Gernon founded IBB Media Ltd to launch "BrassPass TV," a subscription-based streaming platform for the brass band community. This venture received a £100,000 loan from the Greater Manchester Export Loan Fund, indicating institutional validation at the SME level.
• Current Ambitions: Recent projects include producing the "Matt Goss Experience" album at Abbey Road Studios and a "Tubular Bells" 50th-anniversary project. This ambition to transition from niche brass band streaming to high-capital film financing (£27m) creates psychological vulnerability exploited in the current scenario.

Red Flags Related to Martin:

• Multiple failed businesses with all Centre Stage Group companies now in liquidation.
• Critical reliance on a promised £27 million investment with repeated delays and excuses.
• No prior track record managing funds of this scale, making the 100 million tranche economically incoherent.
• Financial history shows significant insolvency events and heavy reliance on external funding.
• While a respected figure in the niche brass music media, his financial profile is vulnerable to fraud targets.

4.2 IBB Media Limited (Associated Entity)

Full Legal Name: IBB MEDIA LIMITED
Registration Number: 11207225
Jurisdiction: England & Wales
Incorporation Date: 15 February 2018
Registered Office: Unit 14 Trident Park, Trident Way, Blackburn, Lancashire, BB1 3NU (Previously Rochdale)
Key Principal: Martin Francis Gernon (Director and Person with Significant Control)

Business Activity: Media production entity, primarily focused on the "BrassPass" digital platform. Classified as a micro-entity for accounting purposes, filing "Total Exemption" accounts (turnover < £10.2 million).

Red Flags:

• Small media company (founded 2018) that historically needed public funding support (£100k loan from UK export fund).
• Suddenly positioning to host a £27 million film fund is a drastic leap.
• Financial filings show approximately £4.8 million in net assets (possibly due to intangible assets or investor advances), but also significant liabilities and active bank charges.
• Inconsistent financial profile and heavy dependence on a single large investor make it highly vulnerable.
• If raising significant capital, company would typically file new share allotments or industry announcements—none found.
• Not a regulated investment firm, yet positioning to manage a £27m fund without FCA authorization.

4.3 Sateesh Vidhyanadhan (The Broker)

The individual identified as the "broker" for the transaction is a senior IT executive based in London, operating a micro-entity alongside his primary employment. This duality creates a significant compliance gap, as institutional deals of this scale are never handled by un-vetted consultants.

Full Legal Name: Sateesh Vidhyanadhan
Date of Birth: December 1980
Nationality: British
Role: Active Director, Finasolve Limited
Current Address: 308 Hillcross Avenue, Morden, England, SM4 4EU

Professional Background:

• Centrica: Head of Digital Transformations & Technology (Oct 2022 – Present), focusing on AI, Fintech, and regulatory change.
• BGC Partners: Delivery Manager / Project Manager (July 2017 – Feb 2023).
• Deutsche Bank: Lead Project Manager (May 2015 – July 2017).
• Citi: Project roles (2011–2015).

Professional Background (Finasolve):

Finasolve: Managing Director (July 2017 – Present). Describes this role as facilitating "multimillion-dollar series rounds" and "syndicate financing."

Red Flags:

• Operates a small consultancy with poor compliance history.
• Finasolve Ltd faced multiple compulsory strike-off notices for late filings.
• Professional background in IT/Fintech, not investment banking—raising serious questions about role brokering a £100 million deal.
• Involvement in numerous short-lived companies and abrupt director resignations signals potential instability or opportunism.
• No known criminal record, but operates in undefined regulatory space.
• Not FCA-regulated as a financial services provider, yet acting as broker for institutional-grade capital.

4.4 Finasolve Limited (Associated Entity)

Full Legal Name: FINASOLVE LIMITED
Registration Number: 10753669
Jurisdiction: England & Wales
Incorporation Date: 4 May 2017
Registered Office: 308 Hillcross Avenue, Morden, England, SM4 4EU
Key Principal: Sateesh Vidhyanadhan (Director/PSC)

Regulatory Status:

No FCA Authorization: There is no record of Finasolve Limited being authorized by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) to conduct regulated activities such as arranging deals in investments or asset management. This is a critical finding for an entity purporting to broker a £100m transaction.

Red Flags:

• Micro-entity with minimal footprint and no evidence of substantial capital or transactions.
• Classified as a micro-company with under 10 employees and negligible turnover.
• Multiple compulsory strike-off actions by Registrar of Companies: Dec 2025, March 2024, July 2022, July 2021.
• For a financial services firm purporting to broker £100m deals to be repeatedly threatened with dissolution suggests the entity is either dormant, abandoned, or managed with gross incompetence.
• Lacks the financial substance to indemnify any losses.

4.5 "Dhaya" (Dhayanidhi Alagiri) – The Investor

The "Indian investor" referred to as "Dhaya" and linked to "AVM" has been positively identified as Dhayanidhi Alagiri, a member of one of India's most powerful political dynasties.

Full Legal Name: Dhayanidhi Alagiri (also known as Durai Dayanidhi)
Aliases: Dhaya, Durai

Family Connections:

• Father: M.K. Alagiri, former Union Minister of Chemicals and Fertilizers (Government of India).
• Grandfather: M. Karunanidhi, former Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu and patriarch of the DMK party.
• Cousin: Udhayanidhi Stalin, current Deputy Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu.

Business Associations:

• Cloud Nine Movies: Owner/Founder. Produced blockbusters like Mankatha.
• Olympus Granites Pvt Ltd: Director. This entity is central to the corruption allegations discussed below.
• AVM Productions Connection: The subject is not a director of AVM Productions. The Alagiri family has historical ties to AVM, and Dhayanidhi has distributed films or held events at AVM Studios. The claim that he is "of AVM" appears to be a misrepresentation used to leverage AVM's sterling reputation while hiding his own toxic financial profile.

Red Flags:

• Identity unverified until investigation—only referred to by first name initially with AVM Productions association (suspicious).
• No public record of large foreign investments by AVM Productions, making the claimed £100 million investment unusual.
• Pattern of delays citing illness without proof of funds—classic warning sign of scam.
• Claims made are unsubstantiated despite supposed contracts and agreements.

5. Legal & Criminal History

5.1 Dhayanidhi Alagiri: The "Granite Scam"

Dhayanidhi Alagiri is a named accused in the "Granite Scam," a massive illegal mining scandal in the state of Tamil Nadu, India, estimated to have caused a loss of ₹16,000 crore (approx. £1.5 billion) to the state exchequer. This is a matter of Indian federal record and makes any funds originating from him "toxic" under global AML standards.

Criminal Charges:

• Section 120B: Criminal Conspiracy.
• Section 420: Cheating and dishonesty inducing delivery of property.
• Section 447: Criminal Trespass.
• Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA): The Enforcement Directorate (ED) has registered a case against him for laundering the proceeds of the illegal granite mining.

Fugitive Status:

• In 2012, following the registration of FIRs, Dhayanidhi went into hiding.
• A Non-Bailable Warrant (NBW) was issued by the Melur Judicial Magistrate court.
• He was declared an "absconding accused," and police formed 15 special teams to hunt him down, issuing Look Out Circulars (LOCs) at airports.
• He eventually surrendered in December 2012 and was granted conditional bail.

Tax Litigation:

• Charge sheet filed against him for failure to remit Tax Deducted at Source (TDS) collected from employees.
• His sister, Anjugaselvi, faced non-bailable warrants for failing to file income tax returns for seven consecutive years.
• PMLA summons challenged in Madras High Court; in 2021, the High Court dismissed his petition, directing him to face trial.

5.2 Martin Gernon: Criminal & Sanction Profile

No criminal convictions or sanctions found. Martin Gernon does not appear on global watchlists or sanctions lists (e.g. OFAC, Interpol). He is not a Politically Exposed Person (PEP). Martin's only legal involvements are related to business insolvencies (civil matters) rather than criminal wrongdoing.

Important Context: Martin was a victim of fraud by employees in a prior business (Centre Stage Uniforms Ltd), which collapsed after the discovery of internal financial misconduct. In that 2010 report, the employees' fraud led to the business's demise, not any action by Martin himself. Martin cooperated with insolvency proceedings when his company failed in 2022. There is no evidence Martin has ever been personally prosecuted or penalized in a criminal court.

5.3 Sateesh Vidhyanadhan: Criminal & Regulatory Profile

No criminal records or charges found. Sateesh is not listed on any sanction or anti-money-laundering watchlist. He is a British national with a professional background in corporate IT and consulting; he does not hold any public office that would make him a PEP.

However, Critical Legal Exposure:

• Finasolve's compliance lapses (multiple "First Gazette" strike-off notices for failure to file accounts on time) resulted in official warnings.
• Regulatory Risk: Acting as a financial broker without regulatory authorization could breach UK law (Financial Services and Markets Act) if he's arranging investments; no evidence found of FCA accreditation.
• Operating Unregulated: Facilitating investment activities in the financial space without authorization is a latent legal concern.

6. Civil Litigation & Disputes

6.1 Martin Gernon: Insolvency History

Martin's history shows significant civil activity related to company insolvencies. He has been a director of at least four companies that entered creditors' voluntary liquidation (CVL) in the UK. This indicates a historical struggle to maintain solvent operations without external injections.

Liquidations:

• Centre Stage Uniforms Ltd (08726454): Liquidated in late 2022. London Gazette records from December 2022 detail a creditors' meeting convened by Martin, which subsequently had liquidators appointed on 28 Dec 2022.
• Centre Stage Percussion Ltd: Dissolved through insolvency.
• The Centre Stage Group Ltd: Currently in liquidation.

Analysis of Insolvency Pattern:

• These liquidations suggest civil disputes with creditors—likely stemming from internal fraud and financial losses suffered by the businesses.
• Martin himself was not sued personally (no personal bankruptcy filings found).
• The companies under his leadership defaulted on debts.
• Creditors file claims in insolvency proceedings; Centre Stage Uniforms' case shows a meeting to decide on liquidators and possibly a liquidation committee.
• No evidence of wrongful trading accusations or director disqualification in these cases—meaning the liquidations appear to have been handled routinely, not as fraudulent trading matters.

Red Flag Perspective: Martin's history shows a trail of unpaid creditors and business failures, which could invite future civil claims if mismanagement were alleged. From a due diligence perspective, this demonstrates vulnerability to fraud due to financial desperation—a classic vulnerability target for sophisticated scammers looking for a "rescue" fund.

6.2 Sateesh Vidhyanadhan: Litigation Profile

No civil lawsuits or court judgments involving Sateesh by name were found. He has not been named in any High Court or County Court case in public sources. Finasolve Limited likewise shows no County Court Judgments (CCJs) or litigation records.

Notable Pattern:

Sateesh has been involved with multiple companies that were dissolved—some shortly after formation. For example: Indo UK Business Consortium Ltd (Dissolved; Sateesh director for only a few months) and Global B2B Marketplace Links Ltd (Dissolved; Sateesh director for only a few months).

Potential Civil Risk: If the promised £100 million investment fails to materialize, IBB Media or Martin could theoretically sue Sateesh/Finasolve for misrepresentation or breach of contract. At present, no such legal action is known, but the groundwork for dispute is evident given the high stakes and unfulfilled promises.

6.3 IBB Media Ltd: Litigation Profile

No direct civil litigation involving IBB Media was found. The company has not been sued in the High Court. IBB Media did receive a £100,000 loan from a Greater Manchester fund in 2019, and presumably that loan is being repaid (no public default reported).

Secured Transactions:

• Outstanding floating charge to HSBC Bank from October 2018 (indicating a general bank lending facility, but no sign of enforcement).
• Charge to Trigger Films Ltd in March 2024 was satisfied by Jan 2025, implying IBB borrowed (likely to finance a project) and then paid it back.
• No liens or legal claims beyond those secured transactions have been filed.

Analysis: Currently, IBB Media shows no judgments or legal claims, but its financial moves (heavy borrowing and reliance on a potential investor) put it at risk of future civil disputes if obligations aren't met.

7. Financial Profile & Economic Footprint

7.1 Martin Gernon's Financial Position

Martin is a career media entrepreneur and musician whose personal wealth appears limited relative to the transactions in question. His income sources historically include proceeds from IBB Media's projects (concert productions, BrassPass TV subscriptions) and previously, his Centre Stage percussion equipment and uniforms business.

Financial Vulnerability:

• In 2019, IBB Media was sufficiently small/early-stage that it sought a £100k public loan to grow.
• No sign Martin has significant assets outside his businesses.
• The series of liquidations suggests Martin may have lost money or at least not accumulated much surplus.
• Any "wealth" of Martin's is likely tied up in IBB Media's equity, which itself is contingent on this anticipated fund.

Balance Sheet Analysis (IBB Media as of April 2024):

• Assets: ~£6.3M | Liabilities: ~£1.47M | Net Assets: ~£4.83M (likely intangible).
• Net assets dropped slightly (~£25k) in 2024, perhaps due to operating losses, indicating Martin isn't injecting personal funds to cover costs.
• Debt: Martin has taken on bank loans and private loans from Trigger Films to finance operations.

Overall: Martin's financial footprint is that of a passionate entrepreneur often overextended financially, now banking on a transformative investment to solve funding needs. This disparity between current means and projected funds is a critical red flag: it suggests Martin is overly reliant on the validity of this investor for his solvency.

7.2 Dhayanidhi Alagiri's Financial Position: The "Frozen Billionaire"

Wealth Origins: Derived from the political influence of the Alagiri/Karunanidhi family and the contentious granite mining operations.

Liquidity Crisis: With ₹40 crore explicitly attached and remaining assets under the microscope of the CBI and ED, Dhayanidhi does not have free access to the global banking system. "High Net Worth" in this context is theoretical; his capital is chemically bound by legal freezing orders.

The Kill Switch: Any "fresh" funds of £100m appearing in his accounts would immediately be frozen as suspected proceeds of crime by UK authorities under AML regulations and corresponding banking restrictions. The Indian banking system, under strict KYC/AML regulations for PEPs, would not permit an outward remittance of this magnitude from an individual with his specific legal status.

8. Red Flag Synthesis & Analysis

This section synthesizes the disparate data points into a coherent analysis of the fraud mechanics.

8.1 The "Hospitalization" Deception (Mechanism of Stall)

The Claim: "Dhaya had been in hospital with an infection so couldn't action the transaction."
Analysis: This is a classic Social Engineering tactic. Scammers use real-world events (a stroke, a war, a pandemic) to explain delays. This prevents the victim from walking away ("I can't be angry at a man in a coma"). It buys time for the scammers to extract "legal fees" or "facilitation payments" from the victim to "bypass" the sick investor's signature requirement. Dhaya is sick, but the sickness is being weaponized to explain the non-arrival of a structurally impossible transfer.

8.2 The "Source of Funds" Impossibility

Analysis: The proposed £100m investment is structurally impossible. Regulatory Block: Dhayanidhi Alagiri is a PEP under active money laundering investigation. No UK bank (compliance department) would accept an inbound transfer of £27m from him without a Source of Wealth dossier thicker than a phone book. The funds would be blocked at the correspondent banking level immediately. Liquidity Block: His assets are attached. He literally does not have the money to send.

8.3 Unusual Transaction Structure

The deal as described (a foreign film investor putting money into a UK film fund via an informal broker) is unusual. Large Indian studios do not typically invest in foreign startup funds—they would co-produce established films or acquire distribution rights. Also, £100 M being spread "across companies" hints at perhaps a scheme where multiple businesses are targeted with the same story. This could be a serial scam where Finasolve promises funding to several small firms, collects fees or other benefits, and none of them actually get funded.

8.4 Reputation as Collateral vs. Verified Performance

One subtle risk is that both Martin and Sateesh may be trading on their respectable reputations to reassure each other (and others) while neither actually has evidence. Martin trusts Sateesh because he's an ex-Centrica professional; Sateesh uses Martin's genuine passion and legitimate music business as proof to Dhaya that the project is real. Meanwhile, "Dhaya" brandishes AVM's name to win trust. It's a triangle of borrowed credibility—but none of the trust is based on verified performance in such transactions.

9. Extensive Conclusion & Action Plan

9.1 Summary of Findings

This investigation has uncovered a compelling and multi-layered pattern of fraud risk, culminating in an overwhelming case for the termination of this transaction. The evidence points unequivocally toward one of three scenarios, all catastrophic for Martin Gernon and IBB Media: Advanced Fee Fraud (Most Likely); Structural Impossibility; or Identity Theft & Impersonation.

9.2 Scam vs. Legitimate Deal Decision Tree

Why the Preponderance of Evidence Points to Fraud:

• Impossibility of Fund Transfer: A PEP with frozen assets cannot make a legitimate £27m transfer without source-of-wealth documentation that would necessarily reveal illicit origins or non-existence of funds.
• Regulatory Violation by Broker: Sateesh/Finasolve are operating as investment intermediaries without authorization, which is a criminal breach of UK law.
• Zero Proof of Funds After Extended Delays: The total absence of any money movement after extended promises is diagnostic of advanced fee fraud.
• Psychological Vulnerability of Target: Martin's history of business failures and current desperation for capital makes him a classic target for confidence scams.
• Use of Real Illness as Delay Tactic: The stroke is real, but its use as repeated explanation for delays is a sophisticated social engineering tactic.

9.3 Specific Fraud Scenarios Likely to Unfold

• Scenario A: Advance Fee Extraction (Imminent). Martin will soon be contacted with urgent news: funds are "ready" but "stuck in regulatory clearance". He will be asked to pay "facilitation fee," "legal processing costs," or "anti-money laundering clearance tax" of £50k-£250k to "unlock" the transfer. Payment will be sent via wire to an offshore account, rendering it irretrievable.
• Scenario B: Dilution & Control Extraction. If contracts have already assigned equity to "Dhaya," Martin may find that shareholder agreements have provisions allowing forced dilution or control transfer if payment milestones are missed. Martin could be forced to surrender control of IBB Media in exchange for a reduced settlement.

9.4 The Mathematical Impossibility Argument

From a regulatory perspective: Dhayanidhi is a confirmed PEP under ED investigation; his assets are frozen. No UK bank would accept a £27m transfer from a frozen PEP account without Source of Wealth documentation proving funds are legitimate. In practice, no such documentation exists for this individual—hence, no transfer will occur. The fact that "Dhaya" has not engaged the banking system directly (instead routing through Sateesh/Finasolve) confirms he knows legitimate banking is unavailable to him.

9.5 Immediate Actions Required

1. Cease All Negotiations Immediately: Do not respond to Sateesh or representatives of "Dhaya". Do not sign anything or make any payments.
2. Secure Legal Counsel: Engage a solicitor experienced in fraud and contract law. Seek advice on rescission of any agreements already signed.
3. Notify Relevant Authorities: File a report with National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (Action Fraud) in the UK. Provide all evidence to assist in investigation.
4. Investigate Existing Contracts: Review signed agreements to determine if board seats or control rights have been granted.
5. Clarify Financial Obligations: Determine if any bridge loans have been taken in anticipation. Immediately seek alternative funding or negotiate extended payment terms.
6. Preserve Evidence: Save all emails, messages, contracts, and communications. Document the timeline of events and broken promises.

References

Legal Disclosure & Compliance