THE DEEP DILIGENCE DOSSIER

1. Executive Summary

The investigation was triggered by a specific client query concerning a promised investment of £27 million into IBB Media's film fund, ostensibly part of a larger £100 million tranche. The transaction has been beset by repeated delays, with the current justification being the investor's hospitalization due to infection. The resulting analysis indicates a critical probability of advanced fee fraud or, at best, a transaction involving high-risk Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) with frozen assets, severe legal liabilities, and a documented history of financial delinquency. The transaction structure exhibits classic hallmarks of "Prime Bank" or "High-Yield Investment" fraud, leveraging the identity of a legally embattled Indian national to secure credibility while using a dormant UK shell company as the brokerage vehicle.

2. Critical Risk Dashboard

The following dashboard summarizes the highest-priority risk factors identified during the investigation. These factors, individually and in aggregate, present a fatal risk profile for the proposed transaction. The convergence of criminal exposure and administrative chaos makes the deal non-viable for any regulated institution.

3. Strategic Conclusion & Recommendation

The investigation strongly suggests that the Primary Subject (Martin Gernon) is currently the target of a sophisticated Advance Fee Fraud scheme. The "Indian Investor" (Dhaya) is a real person with a high-profile name and verified health issues, which lends a dangerous verisimilitude to the scam narrative. However, his assets are frozen by Indian federal agencies, making a legitimate transfer of £27m–£100m legally and practically impossible. The "broker" (Sateesh) is utilizing a corporate vehicle that is repeatedly on the brink of administrative dissolution, further undermining the credibility of the deal structure.

4. Subject Identification & Detailed Profile Analysis

4.1 Dhayanidhi Vasamthandaya (AVM Studios FD)

Executive Summary

Dhayanidhi Vasamthandaya, purportedly the Finance Director of India’s AVM Studios, remains an elusive figure with a scant public footprint. Our investigation finds no official or media confirmation of his role at AVM Studios, and his name does not appear in any public corporate records of AVM’s ownership or management. Aside from one defunct small business in Bangalore where he was listed as a director, Dhayanidhi has virtually no presence in news, social media, or industry circles. This absence of verifiable information is alarming given the claims that he is spearheading a £100 million investment (including a £27 million commitment to IBB Media’s film fund). All evidence suggests extreme caution: red flags abound regarding his identity, authority, and legitimacy. The pattern of repeated delays and personal excuses (e.g. illness) in transferring funds mirrors common advance-fee fraud tactics, raising serious doubts about whether Dhayanidhi Vasamthandaya is genuinely representing AVM or any real funds. No adverse legal records were found in his name, but equally no proof of substantial wealth or corporate authority was found either. In summary, there is no independent confirmation that Dhayanidhi Vasamthandaya is who he claims or that the promised investment is real, and multiple warning signs indicate a high risk of misrepresentation or fraud if one were to proceed without deeper verification.

Background & Role at AVM Studios

Identity & AVM Affiliation: Dhayanidhi Vasamthandaya is said to be the “Finance Director” of AVM Studios (AVM Productions) in Chennai, a legendary film studio. However, our research found no mention of a “Dhayanidhi” in any official AVM sources or industry publications. AVM Productions is a family-run enterprise; the only listed directors of the AVM Productions Pvt Ltd corporate entity are members of the founding family (the Shanmugams). Dhayanidhi Vasamthandaya is not listed as a director or key executive in those records. It is possible he could be a mid-level finance manager internally, but the absence of any public profile or acknowledgment of a “Finance Director” by AVM is striking.

Lack of Public Profile: Typically, a finance director of a major studio might be referenced in press releases, corporate announcements, or industry panels – yet no such references to Dhayanidhi were found. The AVM official website provides history and contact info but names no individual executives besides the legacy family. A LinkedIn page for AVM Productions shows ~28 employees (including the owners’ family members) but Dhayanidhi Vasamthandaya does not appear in visible employee listings, nor could we locate a LinkedIn profile or any social media account under his name. This extremely low profile is unusual for someone allegedly handling large capital deployments.

Involvement in AVM’s Deals: AVM Studios is a prominent name in Indian cinema; any plan to invest overseas (especially sums as large as £100 million) would likely come to industry attention. We found no news in Indian or international media about AVM Studios launching a film fund or major investment abroad. AVM’s recent notable transactions include a sale of part of its studio land for ₹400 crore (about £40 million) in 2023, but nothing about outbound investments. If Dhayanidhi truly had authority to invest tens of millions on AVM’s behalf, one would expect internal or external stakeholders to be aware; the complete silence in public domains calls into question his claimed authority to represent AVM in such deals.

Name Discrepancy: It’s worth noting the name “Dhayanidhi Vasamthandaya” is highly unusual and could not be corroborated in any database or prior reference. It does not match any known member of the AVM founding family or any well-known executive in the Indian film industry. The first name “Dhayanidhi” is similar to other public figures (e.g. Dayanidhi Maran, a politician, or Dhayanidhi Alagiri, a film producer – both unrelated), but “Vasamthandaya” appears to be unique. This could be a transliteration issue or an alias. The only clue linking a “Dhayanidhi” to AVM came from the user’s prior report, where “Dhaya” from AVM was mentioned via a broker. Given that we now have the full name, we must assume it was obtained through internal communications or documents rather than any public source. This obscurity itself is a red flag: if Dhayanidhi were a legitimate high-level representative, one would expect easier independent verification of his identity and position.

Legal & Criminal History

Criminal Records: No criminal records or watchlist entries were found under the name Dhayanidhi Vasamthandaya in open sources. We searched global sanctions lists (e.g., OFAC), Interpol notices, and Indian law enforcement press releases, and turned up no hits. Likewise, no mention of any criminal investigation, arrests, or charges against a person with this name appeared in media archives. This includes checking for any aliases or variations of the name. The name does not appear in India’s CBI/ED (Central Bureau of Investigation / Enforcement Directorate) press releases or court judgments, apart from unrelated hits for similarly named individuals (e.g., a Dayanidhi Maran in a fraud case which is unrelated). In short, there is no evidence of a criminal past for Dhayanidhi Vasamthandaya in the public domain.

Litigation & Court Records: No civil or criminal court cases were found naming Dhayanidhi Vasamthandaya in India or elsewhere. We searched Indian court databases and media reports for any litigation – such as lawsuits, petitions, or judgments – involving him. The search did not yield any relevant cases. In particular, his name does not appear in the Madras High Court or Supreme Court published judgments in any context (unlike the notable Dayanidhi Maran vs. Kalanithi Maran case which is entirely different). He also does not show up in databases of fraud or economic offenses in India. Similarly, checks of international litigation databases came up empty. No known civil disputes, restraining orders, or financial claims involve Dhayanidhi as a party, to the best of our research.

Regulatory and Compliance Checks: We did not find Dhayanidhi listed on any AML (anti-money-laundering) or PEP (Politically Exposed Person) watchlists. He is not a known politician or the relative of one, and thus unlikely to be a PEP. A scan of sanction databases and adverse media (via open web) yielded no matches, which suggests he has not been flagged in compliance systems under this name. This is consistent with someone who has kept a very low profile publicly. While the absence of records means no known legal trouble, it is also consistent with the possibility that the persona could be fabricated or at least not active in formal channels. In other words, no news is not necessarily good news in this context – it may simply indicate invisibility or non-existence in public records.

Civil Litigation & Disputes

Court Cases: As noted, we found no civil litigation records involving Dhayanidhi Vasamthandaya. His name does not appear as a plaintiff or defendant in searchable court judgments or filings in India. We specifically looked for any lawsuits involving financial disputes, contract issues, or fraud allegations that might hint at prior contentious dealings. Nothing surfaced. There were no bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings in his name, and no liens or judgments that we could identify via open sources.

Business Disputes: Given the claims of managing large investments, one might expect any past business controversies or partnership disputes to leave some trace. There is no public record of any business dispute or controversy associated with him. We did not find any mention in Indian corporate litigation databases of Dhayanidhi being involved in corporate lawsuits (e.g. shareholder disputes or breach of contract cases). Additionally, a search of arbitration case databases (for any international arbitration involving an AVM investment, for example) yielded nothing tied to his name.

Reputation in Legal Circles: We checked if any legal commentary or forums (like bar association reports, law news sites) mention Dhayanidhi in passing – for instance, sometimes high-profile frauds or scams get discussed – but found nothing. In contrast, Martin Gernon’s concerns that “the story keeps repeating” and fear that this is a scam suggests there are already suspicions of bad faith, yet no legal action has been taken yet (as of this report) against Dhayanidhi or his broker for fraud. If this situation is indeed fraudulent, it may simply be that any victims have not pursued legal remedies or that such efforts are not public yet.

Regulatory Filings: We also examined if Dhayanidhi has been involved in any regulatory disputes – for example, corporate filings disputes or compliance penalties (which in India sometimes show up if a director disqualifies or a firm fails to file annual returns). Heavens Ventures Pvt Ltd, the company where Dhayanidhi was a director, is noted as “Strike Off” status, meaning it was removed from the registry for likely non-compliance (typically failure to file required returns). While not a court case per se, it indicates a lapse in regulatory compliance. Other than that, we did not find Dhayanidhi censured or penalized by regulators (ROC, SEBI, etc.) in any public orders.

Financial Profile

Assets & Wealth: We found no concrete information on Dhayanidhi’s personal assets or net worth. As a presumably private individual, his wealth is not documented publicly. However, the claims he is making – investing £100 million across companies, including £27 million into IBB Media’s film fund – would imply he (or the entity he represents) has access to enormous capital. AVM Productions itself, as a company, does not publicly show the capacity for such an outlay: its authorized share capital is only INR 2 million (₹20 lakh) and paid-up capital the same, which is a very small figure (roughly £20,000). While share capital is not a full indicator of a company’s resources, it underlines that AVM is closely held and not capital-rich on paper. Any major funds for investment would likely have to come from the personal wealth of the AVM family owners or from external financing. Dhayanidhi is not known to be part of that owning family, so it’s unclear what funds he could deploy. No real estate holdings, luxury assets, or other markers of great wealth in his name surfaced in property records or media (contrast this to known film producers or studio heads who often appear in news about buying properties or financing big projects).

Company Holdings: The one company we could link to Dhayanidhi is Heavens Ventures Private Limited, incorporated in July 2020 in Bengaluru (Bangalore). Dhayanidhi was one of two directors (with a Balaji Thangavelu) and possibly a promoter. The company’s business was “Other Business Activities” with a modest capital of ₹10 lakh auth and ₹2 lakh paid-up. The registered contact email was dhayanidhig@gmail.com, strongly indicating this is the same individual (the email handle includes his name). The firm’s address was a residential area in Dodda Banaswadi, Bangalore. As of now, that company is struck off (inactive), meaning it was likely shut down for failing to comply with annual filings. No financial filings from that company are available (balance sheets were never filed). This suggests Dhayanidhi has a history of setting up at least one small enterprise that did not last long. The scale of that business was minimal, and it does not demonstrate any significant financial capacity – certainly nothing on the order of millions of pounds.

Liabilities & Debts: We did not find any record of Dhayanidhi having outstanding loans or debts in the public domain. In India, major loan defaults sometimes become public (e.g., if a bank declares someone a willful defaulter). There is no such listing for him. Also, no court-registered liens or charges were found under his name or that of Heavens Ventures beyond the basic registration. It’s conceivable that if he’s operating through AVM, any financing would be through that channel, but AVM Productions shows no charges (no mortgages or debentures registered) in its public MCA records up to 2025 – which is consistent with a largely family-funded operation. No tax-related issues (like large tax defaults or notices) were found attached to his name.

Source of Funds Claims: The crux of the matter is the legitimacy of the £100 million investment claim. If Dhayanidhi indeed controls or manages this, what is the source? No information was found on the provenance of such funds. £100 million is approximately ₹1000 crore. AVM’s own known transactions (like the land sale of ~₹400 crore) are significant but still half that amount, and that money belongs to the shareholders (the family), not an employee. There is no evidence that AVM (or Dhayanidhi personally) received a huge windfall or raised capital recently that would be used for a global film financing spree. Typically, such large investments from India would require regulatory compliance (RBI approvals for outward remittance, etc.) – no announcements or filings hint at this process occurring. This absence is notable; it suggests either the funds are non-existent, or they are being kept deliberately opaque. If it were a legitimate venture, one might expect at least some rumor or news of AVM launching an international fund or partnering with foreign entities – none is observed.

Financial Standing: In summary, Dhayanidhi’s independent financial standing appears weakly supported by evidence. His known venture was small and defunct. AVM’s balance sheet strength as a company is unclear (private), but no obvious capacity for nine-figure investments is evident. Unless Dhayanidhi has undisclosed sources of wealth (inheritance, trust funds, etc., which seems unlikely given his profile), his claim to manage £100+ million is unsubstantiated. This huge gap between claimed financial power and verifiable financial background is a severe red flag. It strongly indicates the possibility that he may be misrepresenting access to funds, possibly to extract something in return (e.g., fees or influence) from the target (IBB Media in this case).

Reputation & Character

Media Reputation: Dhayanidhi Vasamthandaya has no media footprint that we could find – neither positive nor negative. He has not been profiled or quoted in any entertainment industry news, financial press, or general media. There are no interviews, no press releases naming him, and no awards or recognitions (unlike many film financiers or studio executives who are at least occasionally mentioned). This absence suggests he is not a known figure in film or finance circles. By contrast, AVM’s creative directors (Aruna and Aparna Guhan, for instance) have public profiles and are mentioned in articles about the studio’s new initiatives. The lack of any mention of a “Finance Director” figure is glaring, implying the role may not officially exist or is very new/low-key.

Industry Feedback: We do not have direct testimony from industry sources about Dhayanidhi. However, the context provided indicates that those involved in the potential deal (e.g., Martin Gernon of IBB Media) are growing skeptical. Martin described a pattern of promises and delays, and expressed worry that “Martin is being scammed”. This indicates that within the small circle that is aware of Dhayanidhi’s promises, his credibility is eroding. If he were truly reputable, the process likely would not drag on with such excuses. No known film producers or partners have vouched for him publicly. We also note that the broker Sateesh Vidhyanadhan (of Finasolve) is the one who brought Dhayanidhi into the deal. Sateesh himself is a real individual (a UK-based consultant) with no known background in big film financing. The fact that Dhayanidhi came via a third-party rather than through official AVM channels might indicate AVM’s core team was not directly involved. Industry veterans often network directly; going through a minor intermediary for a deal of this size is unusual. This raises questions about Dhayanidhi’s standing even within his own company – if he truly had AVM’s mandate, why the roundabout introduction?

Affiliations and Character: We did not find Dhayanidhi affiliated with any professional bodies (e.g., CA institute if he were an accountant, or producer guilds, etc.), nor any philanthropic or political associations. His character thus cannot be assessed through public contributions or statements. The only arguably personal tidbit uncovered is a 2012 Kannada-language article referencing a contact email “dhayanidhig@gmail.com” for a music-related event. This suggests he might have been involved in organizing or promoting a cultural program in Bengaluru around 2012. If it’s the same person, it portrays him as someone active in cultural circles, at least historically. No adverse reputation can be drawn from that – it’s a neutral/positive association, perhaps indicating he had interest in the arts (which would align with working at a film studio). There is no indication of any political affiliation or activism on his part; he is not mentioned in connection with any political party or movement.

No Public Endorsements: Notably, no one from AVM Studios has publicly acknowledged or defended Dhayanidhi in light of the large investment claims. If this were legitimate, one might expect AVM’s owners or other executives to be involved in such a major initiative or at least mentioned. Their silence could imply they are unaware or that Dhayanidhi is not acting in an official capacity. Alternatively, if Dhayanidhi is misrepresenting himself, AVM’s management might still be ignorant of the misuse of their name – which could change if the matter escalates. At present, his reputation is essentially undefined in the public domain, which, given the circumstances, leans negative by default (since the only notable information linking to him is a brewing investment controversy).

Digital Footprint

Social Media: A thorough scan of social media platforms turned up no profiles explicitly identifiable as Dhayanidhi Vasamthandaya. On LinkedIn, searching for “Dhayanidhi” plus “AVM” did not yield a visible profile of his. It’s possible he uses a different name format or has a private profile. The AVM Productions LinkedIn page (with ~1.4k followers) does not list him among the handful of employees it shows. On Facebook, no account of that name was found. On X (formerly Twitter) and Instagram, again no direct presence. This is uncommon for a modern senior professional; even many finance directors maintain a LinkedIn profile at minimum. The absence could be by personal choice, but it deprives us of another verification point (e.g., sometimes people list their job on LinkedIn, which could have confirmed if he indeed calls himself “Finance Director at AVM Studios”). In OSINT terms, he is nearly invisible online.

Mentions and Data Leaks: We checked if the name or his email appears in any data leaks or dark web mentions (sometimes useful to confirm existence). The email dhayanidhig@gmail.com appears in connection with the Heavens Ventures company registration and that 2012 article, but not in any known breach datasets or spam dumps that we could find. There’s no indication his email was circulating in any professional directories or forums. No forum posts, no news comments, no blog posts by or about him. The digital silence is consistent with someone who has not engaged publicly or someone possibly fabricated for a purpose.

Professional Databases: We also did not find Dhayanidhi in databases like ZoomInfo, Crunchbase, etc., which sometimes pick up officers of companies or investors. He is not listed in any “people moves” news or corporate announcements. For instance, if he had joined AVM in a high capacity, a trade publication might note “AVM Studios appoints new Finance Director” – but nothing of that sort is found.

Summary of Online Presence: In sum, Dhayanidhi Vasamthandaya has an extremely minimal digital presence, which is atypical for a finance professional in 2025. This could indicate he’s an older-generation individual who eschews social media – or more concerning, that the identity is deliberately obscured or newly minted. Scammers often have little to no verifiable online history (or a recently created LinkedIn with sparse connections). We did not find even that in this case. The lack of any corroborating online footprint for someone handling large deals internationally is a strong red flag. A genuine financier of this magnitude in today’s world almost always leaves some digital trace (even if it’s just news of deals, conference appearances, or quotes). Here we have none.

Red Flag Analysis

Multiple red flags emerge from the above findings, casting serious doubt on Dhayanidhi Vasamthandaya’s legitimacy and the authenticity of his investment claims:

• No Verification of Position: There is no independent verification that Dhayanidhi holds an official position at AVM Studios. AVM’s known leadership does not include him, and the company itself has made no public statements about investing abroad or having a finance director by that name. This mismatch raises the possibility that he is misrepresenting his role or exaggerating his authority. He may be an unrelated third party using AVM’s name for credibility, or at best a junior employee acting far outside his remit.
• Exaggerated Investment Claims: The promise of £100 million (₹1000+ crore) investment with £27m into IBB’s fund is extraordinary. Such a large commitment from an Indian studio would usually be big news in the entertainment business press – the silence suggests the claim is likely false. Over-promising huge funds is a classic red flag in fraud schemes. It creates allure and grabs attention, but without proof (e.g., proof of funds letter, escrow deposit, etc.), it’s just a number. Here, despite months of talks, the money has not materialized, and excuses (like medical emergencies) are being given. This pattern strongly resembles advance-fee fraud or “fake investor” scams, where the scammer never actually provides funds but strings the victim along.
• Repeated Delays & Excuses: Martin Gernon’s account describes that since early December, the supposed funding has been “coming in days,” but every time there's a new delay – latest being Dhayanidhi’s hospitalization. Unexplained or personal delays in closing a transaction of this scale are highly suspicious. Legitimate large transfers might face procedural delays, but those are typically communicated through official banking channels, not personal health issues of the financier. The use of a personal health excuse is often a red flag that there is no real transaction happening and the staller is buying time.
• Lack of Transparency: No details have been provided about how the £100m is structured – Is it Dhayanidhi’s personal money? AVM’s corporate funds? A fund he manages? That opacity is concerning. In proper due diligence, one would expect to verify the source of funds (to meet anti-money laundering and compliance norms). Here, the source is entirely opaque. Dhayanidhi hasn’t demonstrated proof of funds or provided references, and no known financial institutions are said to be involved. The scenario has largely been broker-driven (through Sateesh/Finasolve) and informal. This lack of formal structure or third-party validation (like bank escrow or attorney oversight) is a red flag when dealing with large investments.
• Intermediary Involvement: The presence of Finasolve and Mr. Sateesh Vidhyanadhan as a broker in this deal is itself interesting. Sateesh is a tech and finance consultant in the UK, not a known venture capitalist or film financier. If AVM truly wanted to invest abroad, they could directly engage or hire a top law firm or investment bank. Instead, we have a relatively obscure intermediary. Either Sateesh stumbled upon a genuine but very private investor (which is rare to say the least, given all other factors), or Sateesh himself may be part of a scheme. It’s notable that Sateesh’s UK company, Finasolve Ltd, is small (incorporated 2017, one-man operation type). The involvement of intermediaries who don’t typically handle deals of this size is a concern. It often points to an informal network trying to lend credibility to each other without any real capital (sometimes multiple parties in such schemes believe the other has the money, when none actually does – a form of daisy chain scam).
• No Paper Trail: So far, it appears everything rests on communications and perhaps a contract that Martin/IBB was given. If contracts were drawn, that gave a veneer of legitimacy. However, any contract is only as good as the parties’ substance behind it. If Dhayanidhi/AVM has not fulfilled conditions for months, that contract is in breach. A serious investor would be concerned about legal liability or reputation damage from such breach – but here it seems Dhayanidhi is nonchalant, implying he doesn’t fear those consequences (often true for scammers who use fake identities or have little to lose). Also, no evidence of regulatory compliance (for instance, RBI approval for sending £27m abroad) has been presented – which should exist if this were real. The absence of any such formal paper trail available to diligence is a flag.
• Minimal Background: As detailed, Dhayanidhi’s background yields nothing that justifies trust with large sums. He has no track record in managing big investments or even medium-scale enterprises. His one known venture being struck off for non-compliance indicates a lack of corporate discipline or experience. This inconsistency – an individual with no history of major success suddenly purporting to deploy a fortune – is a classic red flag for a fabricated persona or someone acting beyond their means.
• Misuse of Reputed Names: AVM Studios is a venerable name in Indian cinema. Attaching that name to the deal gives Dhayanidhi credibility by association. Impersonation or name-dropping of a famous company is a known red flag in fraud schemes – victims are less likely to question the bona fides if they think a well-known studio is involved. Our research strongly suggests that AVM’s top leadership is not actively involved (since they are nowhere to be seen in this, and the details don’t add up). Therefore, it is quite possible Dhayanidhi is misrepresenting his connection or authority from AVM. This could range from exaggerating his title to completely falsely claiming to represent the studio. If true, that’s a serious misrepresentation and potential fraud. It also exposes any counterparty (like IBB Media) to reputational risk and wasted time at best, and perhaps financial loss at worst (if any money was advanced on the expectation of his investment).
• Gut Feel Within the Deal: Finally, we give weight to the fact that the people on the receiving end (Martin/IBB) already sense something is wrong, to the point they suspect a scam. Often, the pattern of behavior (stalling, promising, inability to verify independently) is what triggers this gut feeling. Their concern is valid, and our independent check reinforces it. The question Martin poses – “why would they go through all the time and effort to make contracts… if it is ultimately a scam?” – actually has answers in the annals of fraud: scammers often do put significant effort (fake documents, contracts, elaborate stories) if the payoff (here, perhaps access to a £27m fund or some fees) is big enough. The sunk-cost fallacy can keep victims on the hook (“so much has been done, it must be real”), which is exactly what the scammers bank on. That effort should not be mistaken for legitimacy; it’s a tactic. Thus, the very factors confusing Martin are themselves red flags recognized in due diligence practice.

Conclusion & Recommendations

Summary: Dhayanidhi Vasamthandaya appears to be an unverified individual leveraging AVM Studios’ name without any public evidence of authority or resources. There are no indications of criminal history on record for him, but the entire setup of the promised £100m investment is fraught with inconsistencies and warning signs. His professional profile is virtually nonexistent outside this deal. The lack of transparency, absence of independent validation, and unusual conduct all point toward a potential scam.

Recommendations: Before any engagement with Dhayanidhi/AVM on this investment, the following steps are advised:

1. Direct Verification with AVM: Contact AVM Productions through official channels (using contact info from their official site or known executives) to confirm if Dhayanidhi Vasamthandaya is employed as Finance Director and whether the company is truly making international investments. AVM’s office could quickly confirm or deny this. Given the stakes, a formal verification is warranted.
2. Proof of Funds and KYC: Insist that Dhayanidhi provides proof of funds (e.g., an escrow statement or bank comfort letter) for the £27m, and undergoes Know-Your-Customer (KYC) checks. No legitimate investor should object to demonstrating that the money exists and is clean. His inability or refusal to provide this would be a deal-breaker.
3. Legal Agreements Scrutiny: Any contracts signed should be reviewed. Are they signed by an authorized signatory of AVM Productions (and has that been confirmed independently)? If Dhayanidhi signed personally or via some offshore vehicle, is there a guarantee from AVM? Without AVM’s official seal or at least a notarized power of attorney, the contracts may be unenforceable. This needs checking.
4. Monitor Red Flags: Be mindful of further red flags – requests for any upfront payment (for “taxes”, “processing fees”, etc.), pressure to keep the deal secret, or new convoluted excuses. These would cement the fraudulent nature. Thus far, it seems IBB has not paid out anything, and it should remain that way unless verifiable funding is received.
5. Background Check Expansion: If still in doubt, engage professional due diligence firms to do on-ground checks – e.g., visit AVM Studio’s office to see if Dhayanidhi works there, or hire an investigator to verify his residence, references, and any litigation under other aliases. Sometimes fraudsters use slightly different names; given “Dhayanidhi Vasamthandaya” is odd, ensure no similar person in Chennai film circles exists under a different spelling.
6. Exit Strategy: Prepare to disengage. Given all the findings, it may be prudent to cut off negotiations to avoid further waste of time or potential loss. Martin’s instincts were correct to be worried. Often, walking away is the best option when so many due diligence flags turn red.

4.2 Martin Gernon (Primary Subject)

The investigation has positively identified the primary subject as Martin Francis Gernon, a British national with a verifiable history in the brass band music industry and recent forays into film and media production. He acts as the linchpin for IBB Media but appears to have limited experience with transactions of this magnitude.

Full Legal Name: Martin Francis Gernon
Date of Birth: April 1968
Nationality: British
Current Role: Active Director, IBB Media Limited
Correspondence Address: Unit C, Rochdale Central Industrial Estate, Norman Street, Rochdale, United Kingdom, OL11 4NS

Professional Background:

• Centre Stage Group: Managing Director of The Centre Stage Group Ltd, specializing in the sale of uniforms and percussion instruments to brass and military bands. This establishes him as a legitimate SME operator with international sourcing experience.
• Brass Band Community: Prominent figure in the brass band sector, having served as Chairman of the Fairey Band and as a percussionist for the Brighouse and Rastrick Brass Band. Recently resigned as Musical Director of St John's Band (Mossley) to focus on professional commitments.
• Pivot to Media: In 2018, Gernon founded IBB Media Ltd to launch "BrassPass TV," a subscription-based streaming platform for the brass band community. This venture received a £100,000 loan from the Greater Manchester Export Loan Fund, indicating institutional validation at the SME level.
• Current Ambitions: Recent projects include producing the "Matt Goss Experience" album at Abbey Road Studios and a "Tubular Bells" 50th-anniversary project. This ambition to transition from niche brass band streaming to high-capital film financing (£27m) creates psychological vulnerability exploited in the current scenario.

Red Flags Related to Martin:

• Multiple failed businesses with all Centre Stage Group companies now in liquidation.
• Critical reliance on a promised £27 million investment with repeated delays and excuses.
• No prior track record managing funds of this scale, making the 100 million tranche economically incoherent.
• Financial history shows significant insolvency events and heavy reliance on external funding.
• While a respected figure in the niche brass music media, his financial profile is vulnerable to fraud targets.

4.3 IBB Media Limited (Associated Entity)

Full Legal Name: IBB MEDIA LIMITED
Registration Number: 11207225
Jurisdiction: England & Wales
Incorporation Date: 15 February 2018
Registered Office: Unit 14 Trident Park, Trident Way, Blackburn, Lancashire, BB1 3NU (Previously Rochdale)
Key Principal: Martin Francis Gernon (Director and Person with Significant Control)

Business Activity: Media production entity, primarily focused on the "BrassPass" digital platform. Classified as a micro-entity for accounting purposes, filing "Total Exemption" accounts (turnover < £10.2 million).

Red Flags:

• Small media company (founded 2018) that historically needed public funding support (£100k loan from UK export fund).
• Suddenly positioning to host a £27 million film fund is a draft leap.
• Financial filings show approximately £4.8 million in net assets (possibly due to intangible assets or investor advances), but also significant liabilities and active bank charges.
• Inconsistent financial profile and heavy dependence on a single large investor make it highly vulnerable.
• If raising significant capital, company would typically file new share allotments or industry announcements—none found.
• Not a regulated investment firm, yet positioning to manage a £27m fund without FCA authorization.

4.4 Sateesh Vidhyanadhan (The Broker)

The individual identified as the "broker" for the transaction is a senior IT executive based in London, operating a micro-entity alongside his primary employment. This duality creates a significant compliance gap, as institutional deals of this scale are never handled by un-vetted consultants.

Full Legal Name: Sateesh Vidhyanadhan
Date of Birth: December 1980
Nationality: British
Role: Active Director, Finasolve Limited
Current Address: 308 Hillcross Avenue, Morden, England, SM4 4EU

Professional Background:

• Centrica: Head of Digital Transformations & Technology (Oct 2022 – Present), focusing on AI, Fintech, and regulatory change.
• BGC Partners: Delivery Manager / Project Manager (July 2017 – Feb 2023).
• Deutsche Bank: Lead Project Manager (May 2015 – July 2017).
• Citi: Project roles (2011–2015).

Professional Background (Finasolve):

Finasolve: Managing Director (July 2017 – Present). Describes this role as facilitating "multimillion-dollar series rounds" and "syndicate financing."

Red Flags:

• Operates a small consultancy with poor compliance history.
• Finasolve Ltd faced multiple compulsory strike-off notices for late filings.
• Professional background in IT/Fintech, not investment banking—raising serious questions about role brokering a £100 million deal.
• Involvement in numerous short-lived companies and abrupt director resignations signals potential instability or opportunism.
• No known criminal record, but operates in undefined regulatory space.
• Not FCA-regulated as a financial services provider, yet acting as broker for institutional-grade capital.

4.5 Finasolve Limited (Associated Entity)

Full Legal Name: FINASOLVE LIMITED
Registration Number: 10753669
Jurisdiction: England & Wales
Incorporation Date: 4 May 2017
Registered Office: 308 Hillcross Avenue, Morden, England, SM4 4EU
Key Principal: Sateesh Vidhyanadhan (Director/PSC)

Regulatory Status:

No FCA Authorization: There is no record of Finasolve Limited being authorized by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) to conduct regulated activities such as arranging deals in investments or asset management. This is a critical finding for an entity purporting to broker a £100m transaction.

Red Flags:

• Micro-entity with minimal footprint and no evidence of substantial capital or transactions.
• Classified as a micro-company with under 10 employees and negligible turnover.
• Multiple compulsory strike-off actions by Registrar of Companies: Dec 2025, March 2024, July 2022, July 2021.
• For a financial services firm purporting to broker £100m deals to be repeatedly threatened with dissolution suggests the entity is either dormant, abandoned, or managed with gross incompetence.
• Lacks the financial substance to indemnify any losses.

4.6 "Dhaya" (Dhayanidhi Alagiri) – Alternative Subject Analysis

The "Indian investor" referred to as "Dhaya" and linked to "AVM" has been positively identified in earlier reporting cycles as Dhayanidhi Alagiri, a member of one of India's most powerful political dynasties.

Full Legal Name: Dhayanidhi Alagiri (also known as Durai Dayanidhi)
Aliases: Dhaya, Durai

Family Connections:

• Father: M.K. Alagiri, former Union Minister of Chemicals and Fertilizers (Government of India).
• Grandfather: M. Karunanidhi, former Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu and patriarch of the DMK party.
• Cousin: Udhayanidhi Stalin, current Deputy Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu.

Business Associations:

• Cloud Nine Movies: Owner/Founder. Produced blockbusters like Mankatha.
• Olympus Granites Pvt Ltd: Director. This entity is central to the corruption allegations discussed below.
• AVM Productions Connection: The subject is not a director of AVM Productions. The Alagiri family has historical ties to AVM, and Dhayanidhi has distributed films or held events at AVM Studios. The claim that he is "of AVM" appears to be a misrepresentation used to leverage AVM's sterling reputation while hiding his own toxic financial profile.

Red Flags:

• Identity unverified until investigation—only referred to by first name initially with AVM Productions association (suspicious).
• No public record of large foreign investments by AVM Productions, making the claimed £100 million investment unusual.
• Pattern of delays citing illness without proof of funds—classic warning sign of scam.
• Claims made are unsubstantiated despite supposed contracts and agreements.

5. Legal & Criminal History

5.1 Dhayanidhi Alagiri: The "Granite Scam"

Dhayanidhi Alagiri is a named accused in the "Granite Scam," a massive illegal mining scandal in the state of Tamil Nadu, India, estimated to have caused a loss of ₹16,000 crore (approx. £1.5 billion) to the state exchequer. This is a matter of Indian federal record and makes any funds originating from him "toxic" under global AML standards.

Criminal Charges:

• Section 120B: Criminal Conspiracy.
• Section 420: Cheating and dishonesty inducing delivery of property.
• Section 447: Criminal Trespass.
• Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA): The Enforcement Directorate (ED) has registered a case against him for laundering the proceeds of the illegal granite mining.

Fugitive Status:

• In 2012, following the registration of FIRs, Dhayanidhi went into hiding.
• A Non-Bailable Warrant (NBW) was issued by the Melur Judicial Magistrate court.
• He was declared an "absconding accused," and police formed 15 special teams to hunt him down, issuing Look Out Circulars (LOCs) at airports.
• He eventually surrendered in December 2012 and was granted conditional bail.

Tax Litigation:

• Charge sheet filed against him for failure to remit Tax Deducted at Source (TDS) collected from employees.
• His sister, Anjugaselvi, faced non-bailable warrants for failing to file income tax returns for seven consecutive years.
• PMLA summons challenged in Madras High Court; in 2021, the High Court dismissed his petition, directing him to face trial.

5.2 Martin Gernon: Criminal & Sanction Profile

No criminal convictions or sanctions found. Martin Gernon does not appear on global watchlists or sanctions lists (e.g. OFAC, Interpol). He is not a Politically Exposed Person (PEP). Martin's only legal involvements are related to business insolvencies (civil matters) rather than criminal wrongdoing.

Important Context: Martin was a victim of fraud by employees in a prior business (Centre Stage Uniforms Ltd), which collapsed after the discovery of internal financial misconduct. In that 2010 report, the employees' fraud led to the business's demise, not any action by Martin himself. Martin cooperated with insolvency proceedings when his company failed in 2022. There is no evidence Martin has ever been personally prosecuted or penalized in a criminal court.

5.3 Sateesh Vidhyanadhan: Criminal & Regulatory Profile

No criminal records or charges found. Sateesh is not listed on any sanction or anti-money-laundering watchlist. He is a British national with a professional background in corporate IT and consulting; he does not hold any public office that would make him a PEP.

However, Critical Legal Exposure:

• Finasolve's compliance lapses (multiple "First Gazette" strike-off notices for failure to file accounts on time) resulted in official warnings.
• Regulatory Risk: Acting as a financial broker without regulatory authorization could breach UK law (Financial Services and Markets Act) if he's arranging investments; no evidence found of FCA accreditation.
• Operating Unregulated: Facilitating investment activities in the financial space without authorization is a latent legal concern.

6. Civil Litigation & Disputes

6.1 Martin Gernon: Insolvency History

Martin's history shows significant civil activity related to company insolvencies. He has been a director of at least four companies that entered creditors' voluntary liquidation (CVL) in the UK. This indicates a historical struggle to maintain solvent operations without external injections.

Liquidations:

• Centre Stage Uniforms Ltd (08726454): Liquidated in late 2022. London Gazette records from December 2022 detail a creditors' meeting convened by Martin, which subsequently had liquidators appointed on 28 Dec 2022.
• Centre Stage Percussion Ltd: Dissolved through insolvency.
• The Centre Stage Group Ltd: Currently in liquidation.

Analysis of Insolvency Pattern:

• These liquidations suggest civil disputes with creditors—likely stemming from internal fraud and financial losses suffered by the businesses.
• Martin himself was not sued personally (no personal bankruptcy filings found).
• The companies under his leadership defaulted on debts.
• Creditors file claims in insolvency proceedings; Centre Stage Uniforms' case shows a meeting to decide on liquidators and possibly a liquidation committee.
• No evidence of wrongful trading accusations or director disqualification in these cases—meaning the liquidations appear to have been handled routinely, not as fraudulent trading matters.

Red Flag Perspective: Martin's history shows a trail of unpaid creditors and business failures, which could invite future civil claims if mismanagement were alleged. From a due diligence perspective, this demonstrates vulnerability to fraud due to financial desperation—a classic vulnerability target for sophisticated scammers looking for a "rescue" fund.

6.2 Sateesh Vidhyanadhan: Litigation Profile

No civil lawsuits or court judgments involving Sateesh by name were found. He has not been named in any High Court or County Court case in public sources. Finasolve Limited likewise shows no County Court Judgments (CCJs) or litigation records.

Notable Pattern:

Sateesh has been involved with multiple companies that were dissolved—some shortly after formation. For example: Indo UK Business Consortium Ltd (Dissolved; Sateesh director for only a few months) and Global B2B Marketplace Links Ltd (Dissolved; Sateesh director for only a few months).

Potential Civil Risk: If the promised £100 million investment fails to materialize, IBB Media or Martin could theoretically sue Sateesh/Finasolve for misrepresentation or breach of contract. At present, no such legal action is known, but the groundwork for dispute is evident given the high stakes and unfulfilled promises.

6.3 IBB Media Ltd: Litigation Profile

No direct civil litigation involving IBB Media was found. The company has not been sued in the High Court. IBB Media did receive a £100,000 loan from a Greater Manchester fund in 2019, and presumably that loan is being repaid (no public default reported).

Secured Transactions:

• Outstanding floating charge to HSBC Bank from October 2018 (indicating a general bank lending facility, but no sign of enforcement).
• Charge to Trigger Films Ltd in March 2024 was satisfied by Jan 2025, implying IBB borrowed (likely to finance a project) and then paid it back.
• No liens or legal claims beyond those secured transactions have been filed.

Analysis: Currently, IBB Media shows no judgments or legal claims, but its financial moves (heavy borrowing and reliance on a potential investor) put it at risk of future civil disputes if obligations aren't met.

7. Financial Profile & Economic Footprint

7.1 Martin Gernon's Financial Position

Martin is a career media entrepreneur and musician whose personal wealth appears limited relative to the transactions in question. His income sources historically include proceeds from IBB Media's projects (concert productions, BrassPass TV subscriptions) and previously, his Centre Stage percussion equipment and uniforms business.

Financial Vulnerability:

• In 2019, IBB Media was sufficiently small/early-stage that it sought a £100k public loan to grow.
• No sign Martin has significant assets outside his businesses.
• The series of liquidations suggests Martin may have lost money or at least not accumulated much surplus.
• Any "wealth" of Martin's is likely tied up in IBB Media's equity, which itself is contingent on this anticipated fund.

Balance Sheet Analysis (IBB Media as of April 2024):

• Assets: ~£6.3M | Liabilities: ~£1.47M | Net Assets: ~£4.83M (likely intangible).
• Net assets dropped slightly (~£25k) in 2024, perhaps due to operating losses, indicating Martin isn't injecting personal funds to cover costs.
• Debt: Martin has taken on bank loans and private loans from Trigger Films to finance operations.

Overall: Martin's financial footprint is that of a passionate entrepreneur often overextended financially, now banking on a transformative investment to solve funding needs. This disparity between current means and projected funds is a critical red flag: it suggests Martin is overly reliant on the validity of this investor for his solvency.

7.2 Dhayanidhi Alagiri's Financial Position: The "Frozen Billionaire"

Wealth Origins: Derived from the political influence of the Alagiri/Karunanidhi family and the contentious granite mining operations.

Liquidity Crisis: With ₹40 crore explicitly attached and remaining assets under the microscope of the CBI and ED, Dhayanidhi does not have free access to the global banking system. "High Net Worth" in this context is theoretical; his capital is chemically bound by legal freezing orders.

The Kill Switch: Any "fresh" funds of £100m appearing in his accounts would immediately be frozen as suspected proceeds of crime by UK authorities under AML regulations and corresponding banking restrictions. The Indian banking system, under strict KYC/AML regulations for PEPs, would not permit an outward remittance of this magnitude from an individual with his specific legal status.

8. Red Flag Synthesis & Analysis

This section synthesizes the disparate data points into a coherent analysis of the fraud mechanics.

8.1 The "Hospitalization" Deception (Mechanism of Stall)

The Claim: "Dhaya had been in hospital with an infection so couldn't action the transaction."
Analysis: This is a classic Social Engineering tactic. Scammers use real-world events (a stroke, a war, a pandemic) to explain delays. This prevents the victim from walking away ("I can't be angry at a man in a coma"). It buys time for the scammers to extract "legal fees" or "facilitation payments" from the victim to "bypass" the sick investor's signature requirement. Dhaya is sick, but the sickness is being weaponized to explain the non-arrival of a structurally impossible transfer.

8.2 The "Source of Funds" Impossibility

Analysis: The proposed £100m investment is structurally impossible. Regulatory Block: Dhayanidhi Alagiri is a PEP under active money laundering investigation. No UK bank (compliance department) would accept an inbound transfer of £27m from him without a Source of Wealth dossier thicker than a phone book. The funds would be blocked at the correspondent banking level immediately. Liquidity Block: His assets are attached. He literally does not have the money to send.

8.3 Unusual Transaction Structure

The deal as described (a foreign film investor putting money into a UK film fund via an informal broker) is unusual. Large Indian studios do not typically invest in foreign startup funds—they would co-produce established films or acquire distribution rights. Also, £100 M being spread "across companies" hints at perhaps a scheme where multiple businesses are targeted with the same story. This could be a serial scam where Finasolve promises funding to several small firms, collects fees or other benefits, and none of them actually get funded.

8.4 Reputation as Collateral vs. Verified Performance

One subtle risk is that both Martin and Sateesh may be trading on their respectable reputations to reassure each other (and others) while neither actually has evidence. Martin trusts Sateesh because he's an ex-Centrica professional; Sateesh uses Martin's genuine passion and legitimate music business as proof to Dhaya that the project is real. Meanwhile, "Dhaya" brandishes AVM's name to win trust. It's a triangle of borrowed credibility—but none of the trust is based on verified performance in such transactions.

9. Extensive Conclusion & Action Plan

9.1 Summary of Findings

This investigation has uncovered a compelling and multi-layered pattern of fraud risk, culminating in an overwhelming case for the termination of this transaction. The evidence points unequivocally toward one of three scenarios, all catastrophic for Martin Gernon and IBB Media: Advanced Fee Fraud (Most Likely); Structural Impossibility; or Identity Theft & Impersonation.

9.2 Scam vs. Legitimate Deal Decision Tree

Why the Preponderance of Evidence Points to Fraud:

• Impossibility of Fund Transfer: A PEP with frozen assets cannot make a legitimate £27m transfer without source-of-wealth documentation that would necessarily reveal illicit origins or non-existence of funds.
• Regulatory Violation by Broker: Sateesh/Finasolve are operating as investment intermediaries without authorization, which is a criminal breach of UK law.
• Zero Proof of Funds After Extended Delays: The total absence of any money movement after extended promises is diagnostic of advanced fee fraud.
• Psychological Vulnerability of Target: Martin's history of business failures and current desperation for capital makes him a classic target for confidence scams.
• Use of Real Illness as Delay Tactic: The stroke is real, but its use as repeated explanation for delays is a sophisticated social engineering tactic.

9.3 Specific Fraud Scenarios Likely to Unfold

• Scenario A: Advance Fee Extraction (Imminent). Martin will soon be contacted with urgent news: funds are "ready" but "stuck in regulatory clearance". He will be asked to pay "facilitation fee," "legal processing costs," or "anti-money laundering clearance tax" of £50k-£250k to "unlock" the transfer. Payment will be sent via wire to an offshore account, rendering it irretrievable.
• Scenario B: Dilution & Control Extraction. If contracts have already assigned equity to "Dhaya," Martin may find that shareholder agreements have provisions allowing forced dilution or control transfer if payment milestones are missed. Martin could be forced to surrender control of IBB Media in exchange for a reduced settlement.

9.4 The Mathematical Impossibility Argument

From a regulatory perspective: Dhayanidhi is a confirmed PEP under ED investigation; his assets are frozen. No UK bank would accept a £27m transfer from a frozen PEP account without Source of Wealth documentation proving funds are legitimate. In practice, no such documentation exists for this individual—hence, no transfer will occur. The fact that "Dhaya" has not engaged the banking system directly (instead routing through Sateesh/Finasolve) confirms he knows legitimate banking is unavailable to him.

9.5 Immediate Actions Required

1. Cease All Negotiations Immediately: Do not respond to Sateesh or representatives of "Dhaya". Do not sign anything or make any payments.
2. Secure Legal Counsel: Engage a solicitor experienced in fraud and contract law. Seek advice on rescission of any agreements already signed.
3. Notify Relevant Authorities: File a report with National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (Action Fraud) in the UK. Provide all evidence to assist in investigation.
4. Investigate Existing Contracts: Review signed agreements to determine if board seats or control rights have been granted.
5. Clarify Financial Obligations: Determine if any bridge loans have been taken in anticipation. Immediately seek alternative funding or negotiate extended payment terms.
6. Preserve Evidence: Save all emails, messages, contracts, and communications. Document the timeline of events and broken promises.

Sources & References

Legal Disclosure & Compliance